The English translation of the Mimamsaslokavarttika, the magnumopus of Kumarilabhatta was prepared by Dr. Ganganath Jha and published by the Asiatic Society during 1900-1908. The work was long out of print. But the demand for the same persisted. The Society in its bicentenary year decided to issue a reprint of the same as a mark of respect to the learned translator who utilised both the Kasika of Sucaritamisra and the Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathimisra, which ascertain the view of Kumarila. I am happy that the book is available again to our scholars and researches.
The word Mimasa more properly Purva Mimansa is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini. The other names given to this system are Pureakanda Karma Mimansa, Karmakanda, Yajnavidya, Adhvaramimansa, Dharmamimansa and so forth some people evern speak of it as the Dvadacalackshmi.
Inasmuch as the avowed object of this system is a consideration of Dharma it is commonly spoken of as Dharmanimansa of the Veda there are three sections or kandas. The Karmakanda the Upasanakanda and the juanankanda and it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the purva mimansa and for this reason it is spoken of as purvukanda purvamimansa or karmamimansa. Though the karmakanda of the Veda treats of many such actions as sacrifice only. And for this reason people speak of this as yajnamimansa or Adhvara mimansa.
This consideration of dharma is found to consist of twelve parts and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve Adhyayas and hence the system has come to be known by the name of Dvadacalaskshani.
For a detailed explanation of the subject matter of each Adhyaya and adhikaransa the render is referred to the Appendix.
While Chiefly dealing with these subjects Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the Veda beginningless and authorless were found mentioned here and there at random many sacrifices offerings &c. and hence it was very difficult to understand and grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices &c: Consequently at the time of the performance of a sacrifice at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has once for all been set aside by Jamini by means of the sutras dealt with here. And it was only after the Mimansa philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of karmakanda became easy.
At the very outset Jaimini divided the Vedic sentences into two kinds. The mantra and the Brahmana the former is now known as the Sauhita Rgveda samhita &c. there are many Brahmanas that we known as Upanishat the Brhadaranyaka and the ohandogya. Then again he proceeds to sub divide these two kinds into other sorts the Rk the sama and the yaju.
The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the mantra and the Brahmana are embodied in the sutras II -i-32 and 33 wherein it is said that which at the time of the performance of a sacrifice points out certain details in connection with it is called Mantra and the rest are called Brahmana. But the earlier author have distinctly declared that this definition of Mantra is only a tentative one as there are many Mantras that do not fulfill the conditions herein laid down and are yet called Mantras. The mantras in reality take the place of aphorisms dealing with sacrificial details and the Brahmanas are commentaries on them in fact they are frequently spoken of as such by Cankaracarya.
Rk Yajush and Sama are the three sub divisions of the said two divisions of the Veda. Among Mantras and Brahmanas that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into feet is calle a Rk (Sutra II-i-35) the other names of which are Rca, Cloka, Mnatra the sentence that are capable of being sung are known as Sama (II-i-36) the rest are called yajush )II-i-37).
The text of the Mimansa philosophy is the most extensive of all the Sutras have twelve Adhyayas divided into sixty padas containing about 1,000 Sutras, dealing with 1,000 sections or Adhikaranas.
The word Adhikarana really means discussion Consideration Inquiry Investigation. In the Mimansa we find that each discussion is made up of five parts viz: (1) Vishaya the subject matter under consideration (2) vipaya or suncaya the doubt arising of the opponent and the arguments in support thereof (4) Uttara or Siddhanta the demonstrated conclusion (5) Sanguti Relevancy of the discussion with the particular context. Some author explain uttara as the arguments against the view of the opponent and instead of Sangati they have Nirmaya which then explain as siddhanta. This system of discussion is adopted more or less in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.
The sutras are all arranged in the above order of discussion. But a mere reading of the Sutras does not afford us any idea as to where a discussions ends and another begins. For all these as also for a proper understanding of the Sutras themselves we have to fall back upon certain commentaries upon the sutras.
Of these commentaries and commentaries on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the sutras that is available now is the Bhashya by Cavara Svami (published in the bibliothen Indica) though we find this bhashya referring to other commentaries chief among which is the Vrtti of the revered Upavarsha. On the Bhashya we have the commentary of Kumarila Bhatta generally spoken of as Bhatta. This work is divided into three parts known under three different names (1) Clokavartika treating of the first the Tarka (polemical) Pada of the first adhyaya (published in the caukhambha sanskirt series Benares). (2) the Tantravartika dealing with the last three Padas of Adhyaya 1 and the whole of Adhyayas II and III (published in the Benares Sasnkrit series and being translated into English by the present translator) and (3) the Tuptika dealing with Adhyayas IV-XII (Published in the Benares Sanskrit Series ). On the first of these we know of two commentaries (1) the Kavika by sucarita Micra and (2) the Nyayaratnakara of parthasarathi Miera (published in the Caukhambha Sanskrit series Benares) extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work and (3) the Nyayasudha of Someovara Bhatta. On the second the only commentary we know of is the Nyayasudha generally known as Banaka by somevara Bhatta (in course of publication in the Caukhambha Sanskrit Series Benares) and on the third we have only one vartikabharana by Venkata dikshita the other the tantraratna cannot be spoken of as a commentary in the proper sense of the word as it is a semi independent commentary on the sutras themselves though here and therer taking up and explaining certain passages from the Bhashya and the Vartika. This closes the list of works indirectly dealing with the present work.
Sutra I. | ||
Subject-matter of the Treatise | 1-20 | |
Introduction (1) | 1 | |
Purpose of the Mimansa ? Castra (11) | 2 | |
Connection of the Castra (19) | 3 | |
Various interpretations of the opening passage of the Bhashya (26) | 4 | |
First Interpretation: Universal Explanation (28) | 4 | |
Second Interpretation: Censure (33) | 5 | |
Third Interpretation: Disavowal (37) | 5 | |
Fourth Interpretation: Specification (46-47) | 7 | |
Fifth Interpretation: Praise (59) | 10 | |
Sixth Interpretation: Objection to the use of the word 'atha' (60) | 10 | |
Meaning of the word 'atha' ? Sequence (61) | 10 | |
What is implied by this Sequence: Study of the Veda (69-70) | 11 | |
Other significations of the Sutra (78-82) | 13 | |
Preclusion of Studies other than that of the Veda (82) | 13 | |
Negation of the Bath before Investigation of Dharma (87-88) | 14 | |
Signification of the Bath (100-101) | 17 | |
Signification of the Bath word 'atah' (110) | 18 | |
Meaning of the word 'Dharmajijnasa (115-17) | 18 | |
The Usefulness of Investigation of Dharma (122) | 19 | |
Sutra II. | ||
Definition of Dharma | 21-66 | |
Authority or Means of knowing Dharma (1) | 21 | |
Meaning of the word 'Codana' (3) | 21 | |
Duplicate implication of the Sutra (3) | 22 | |
Authoritativeness of Word (5) | 22 | |
'Codana' = Word (7) | 22 | |
Significations of the word 'lakshana' (9-10) | 22 | |
The Character of Dharma lies not in the Sacrifice itself, but in its capacity of bringing about auspicious results (13) | 23 | |
Preclusion of all other Means of knowledge from the case of Dharma (16) | 24 | |
Authority of the Veda questioned (21) | 24 | |
Self-evident character of the Veda: Does authoritativeness lie in the conception itself, or is it extraneous? (33) | 26 | |
The theory of the extraneous characters of authoritativeness (38) | 27 | |
The theory refuted (47) | 28 | |
Notion of un-authoritativeness due to extraneous influences (53) | 29 | |
Three forms of un-authoritativeness (54) | 29 | |
Excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of un-authoritativeness (65-66) | 31 | |
Absence of an Author safeguards the Veda against all reproach (68) | 31 | |
Only human assertions dependent upon other Pramanas (71) | 32 | |
The authoritativeness of Pramanas does not lie in their compatiblity with one another (73) | 32 | |
The falsity of a Conception explained (86) | 33 | |
Inference not applicable to Veda (89) | 34 | |
Undisputed authority of the Veda (95-96) | 35 | |
Veda not due to human origin (97-98) | 35 | |
Falsity due to non-productiveness of conception (101-102) | 36 | |
'Pratyayita' explained (102-103) | 36 | |
Force of the word 'Va' (109-10) | 37 | |
No omniscient person (111) | 38 | |
Inference and Sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future (115) | 38 | |
Veda not the work of an Omniscient Author (120) | 39 | |
Scriptures composed by human beings not fully authoritative (122) | 39 | |
No grounds for assuming the existence of an omniscient person (132) | 41 | |
The character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the theory an Omniscient Author (149) | 43 | |
Absurdity incurred in denying the authority of the Veda (154) | 43 | |
The sentence 'Nanvavidusham,' explained (155) | 44 | |
The Buddhistic Scriptures false, because composed by human beings (169) | 46 | |
The sentence 'Nanu samanyatodrshtam explained (174-75) | 46 | |
The sentence 'Na, anyatwat' explained (175) | 47 | |
The sentence 'Na hi anyasya, explained (181-82) | 48 | |
Arguments in support of the authenticity of the Veda (184) | 48 | |
'Pratyakshastu, explained (187) | 49 | |
Full signification of the word 'Dharma' (190) | 49 | |
Other meanings refuted (195-96) | 50 | |
No Apurva apart from a potentiality of the Sacrifice (197) | 51 | |
Objections based upon the significance of the word 'Codana' (201) | 51 | |
Reply to these: Codana cannot be restricted to positive activity only (200) | 53 | |
Codana refers to Injunctions as well as Prohibitions (215-16) | 54 | |
Two kinds of consequences following from Sacrifices (221-22) | 54 | |
Action not prohibited cannot be sinful (232-33) | 57 | |
Result not always similar to the Action (235-36) | 57 | |
Vedic Injunctions and Prohibitions the only means of knowing Dharma and Adharma (242-43) | 59 | |
Utilitarian theory of Virtue not tenable (246-47) | 59 | |
Nor the 'Conscience' theory (247-48) | 59 | |
Sacrificial Slaughter not sinful (259) | 61 | |
'Cyena' sacrifice sinful, because resulting in the death of a person (267) | 62 | |
Interpretation of the Sutra justified (277-78) | 64 | |
Sutra III. | ||
Declaration of the subject-matter | 67 | |
Declaration of the subject-matter of the Treatise (1-2) | 67 | |
Sutra IV. | ||
Sense-perception not the means of knowing Dharma | 68-112 | |
The Sutra cannot be taken an embodying a definition of Sense-perception (1) | 68 | |
Change of reading proposed by the Vrtti, with a view to make it a regular definition (13) | 69 | |
Trae meaning of the Sutra (20) | 70 | |
Sense-perception not applicable to Dharma (36) | 73 | |
Necessity of the word 'sat' (36) | 73 | |
The particle 'sam' (38-39) | 74 | |
Functioning of the senses explained (44) | 74 | |
The words' purusha' and 'indriya' (52) | 76 | |
Buddhijanma,' (53-54) | 76 | |
Why Sense-perception is not applicable to Dharma (59) | 77 | |
Self-recognition not the true result of Pramana (79) | 80 | |
Inference, & preceded by Sense-perception (87) | 82 | |
Inference not applicable to Dharma (99) | 84 | |
Analogy not applicable to Dharma (100) | 85 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not applicable to Dharma (101-102) | 85 | |
Veda the only means of knowing Dharma (108) | 86 | |
Inference is based upon Sense-perception (111) | 87 | |
Vedanta theory controverted (114-116) | 87 | |
Abstract perception of an object (118-19) | 88 | |
Abstract ? How made Concrete (120) | 88 | |
Cognition of Class cannot be inferential (138) | 92 | |
Samavaya (148) | 94 | |
Mixed functioning of various sense-organs (159) | 96 | |
The numbers of Senses only Five (169) | 98 | |
Exclusive objects of the Senses-organs differentiated (170) | 98 | |
Cognition of objects not in the form of identification with their verbal expressions (172) | 98 | |
Cognition of objects independent of verbal expressions (176) | 99 | |
The class 'cow' not cognized always in the form of the word 'cow' (180) | 100 | |
Apparent identity of the Word, the Idea, and the Object explained (183) | 100 | |
Imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible (183) | 101 | |
Words not independent of the material forms of objects (193) | 102 | |
In the expression 'blue lotus,' there can be no absolute non-difference between a particular blueness and a particular lotus (197) | 103 | |
Another reason against the imposition of the forms of words upon objects (200) | 104 | |
Until the object is known, the Word cannot give any idea of it (203) | 105 | |
Objects do not depend upon words (205) | 105 | |
It is the form of the object that is cognised through the Word, which cannot suppress it (206) | 105 | |
If verbal forms were imposed upon words, the meaning of the word 'hasta' would differ from that of the word 'kara' (203) | 105 | |
The Imposition theory would falsify all Inference and Verbal Testimony (213) | 106 | |
The form of the Object not dependent upon Word (215) | 106 | |
The relationship between Words and Objects it eternal (219) | 106 | |
In the case of Proper Names also, the words are eternal: it is only their particular application that has a beginning in time (224) | 108 | |
Denotativeness of words not always due to Convention (226) | 108 | |
Conventional restriction explained (228) | 109 | |
The factors of Memory and Perception explained (230-31) | 109 | |
Sense-perception precisely explained (236-37) | 110 | |
Cognitions undefined only so long as words are not found (245-46) | 111 | |
It is the Classes of Objects and their various relationships (as expressed in inferential arguments) that are amenable to Sense-perception, which would not be possible if Perceptive Cognition were always undefined (247-48) | 111 | |
The name of 'Sense-perception' applicable to only such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact (255) | 112 | |
Sutra V. | ||
Authoritativeness of Injunction | 113-408 | |
Section 1: Vartika proper on the Sutra | 112-16 | |
Dharma not amenable to any other Means of Knowledge (2) | 113 | |
Injunction, the only means of knowing it (8) | 114 | |
Necessity of having recourse to Injunction (14) | 115 | |
Section 2: Introduction to the Vrtti on the Sutra | 116-19 | |
Transposition of the words 'tat' and 'sat' in Sutra (4), makes it a definition of Sense-perception (19-20) | 116 | |
Section 3: Nirdlambanavada | 119-48 | |
Necessity of the Discussion (1-3) | 119 | |
Reality of External Objects (4) | 119 | |
'Samurti Reality' synonymous with 'falsity' (8-9) | 120 | |
Pleasures of Heaven not similar to Dreams (11) | 120 | |
Diversity of opinion among various scions of the Bauddhas (14-16) | 120 | |
Two kinds of Denial of External Objects (17-18) | 121 | |
The Idealistic Position Expounded (20-22) | 121 | |
The Reply given by the Bhashya held by some people to be inadequate (28-29) | 123 | |
The Reply otherwise explained (30) | 123 | |
Necessity of the Reality of the External Word (32) | 123 | |
Denial of the Reality of Conceptions renders even the Bauddha tenet untenable (34) | 124 | |
Impossibility of Inference, if objects not real (35) | 124 | |
Denial of the reality of external objects is self-contradictory (53) | 127 | |
Superfluity of the Idealistic Argument (60) | 128 | |
Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appearance (63) | 129 | |
If Cognitions were always without substratum they would never be amenable to Inferential Argumentation (65-66) | 129 | |
Universally recognised Distinctions between Virtue and Vice, Teacher and Pupil, &, would not be possible, if there were no reality in objects (72-73) | 130 | |
Idealism contradicted by facts of ordinary experience (74) | 130 | |
If all Ideas are false, there is universal negation (74-75) | 130 | |
Counter-argument against Idealism (79-80) | 131 | |
Certain self-contradictions in the Idealistic theory (81-82) | 132 | |
If idealism be accepted, all systems of Philosophy are equally false (85-87) | 133 | |
There could be no distinction between false dream cognition and true waking cognition, both being equally unreal (88-89) | 133 | |
No Yogic faculty can supply the necessary explanation (93-94) | 132 | |
Another self-contradiction in the Idealistic theory (99-100) | 135 | |
The Middle Term of the Idealistic Argument is one that is not recognised by the other party (101-102) | 135 | |
The Middle Term of the Argument contradictory and the Instance incompatible (106-107) | 136 | |
The causes of certain common delusions explained (109-13) | 137 | |
Only mistaken cognitions can be said to be devoid of real substratum (117-19) | 138 | |
No Instance of Dissimilarity mentioned in the Idealistic Argument (121-22) | 138 | |
The Mention of such an Instance would involve a double negation, ie., an affirmation ? which would be impossible if no objects existed (124-25) | 139 | |
A reasoning to be effective must be acceptable to both parties (130-31) | 140 | |
The Argument brought forward by the Idealist should contain nothing that he does not accept to be true (143) | 141 | |
That which is now held to be unreal could never have been real (156) | 142 | |
No reality can proceed from a reasoning that is unreal (159) | 142 | |
The Chief Elements in the reasoning of the Idealist are admittedly unreal (163) | 143 | |
Worldly activity not explicable by mere Idea (169) | 143 | |
No specification of Vasana Possible (178-79) | 144 | |
No proof for the existence of Vasana (180-81) | 144 | |
Vasanas, even if extant, could never bring about effects in a serial order (192-93) | 146 | |
It is only a permanent soul that can serve as the substratum of Vasanas (199-200) | 147 | |
Buddha propounded the Idealsitic theory with the sole view of turning the minds of men away from wordly objects (202) | 148 | |
Section 4: Cunyavada | 148-82 | |
Inferential Idealistic arguments expounded in detail (2-63) | ||
No difference between the shape of the Cognition and the Cognised (6) | 148 | |
It is only that which is Cognised that can have an existence (7) | 148 | |
The Shape cognised cannot belong to the external object (9) | 149 | |
The character of the Cogniser cannot be attributed to the Object (13) | 149 | |
The real character of Cognitions is absolutely pure, and it is only ever-continuing Vasanas that make it appear in diverse forms (15-17) | 149 | |
Another reason for attributing the form to Cognitions (21) | 150 | |
Otherwise the Cognition could not appear prior to the comprehension of the Objects (25) | 150 | |
Third Argument to show that the form belongs to Cognitions (32) | 151 | |
The form of the Object cannot be said to be imposed upon the Cognition (35) | 151 | |
The form cannot be held to be a property of the contact of the Cognition with the Object (42) | 152 | |
Any such Contact not possible in the case (43) | 152 | |
The Idea and the Object both cannot have the same form (55) | 153 | |
Refutation of the above arguments (64-263) | ||
Idea cannot be both the Cogniser and the Cognised (64) | 154 | |
The case of Self is different ? It can be both ? This fact explained (67) | 155 | |
There is often an idea of the Cognisable Object without that of the Cognising Idea (79) | 156 | |
The comprehension of the Object alone, or of te Idea alone, cannot be explained on the mere ground of Capability or Incapability (95) | 158 | |
The difference between Object and Idea not one of Time and Form only (100) | 159 | |
Predicability and Knowability explained (103) | 159 | |
No absolute difference between any two objects (105) | 160 | |
Cognition being one, the difference in conceptions is due to a diversity among objects (116) | 161 | |
A single object never cognised as both Comprehender and Comprehended (120) | 161 | |
Duality of Existence ? Comprehender and Comprehended ? fully established (129) | 163 | |
No Apoha possible (136) | 164 | |
Reasons against the assumption of Apoha (137) | 164 | |
The character of Idea belongs to the Comprehender only (148-49) | 165 | |
Ideas cannot have, among themselves, the relation of the Conceived and the Means of Conception (149-50) | 165 | |
Peculiar causal relationship between the Object and the Idea (151-52) | 166 | |
Their sequence does not constitute causality (154-55) | 166 | |
Simultaneity of Cause and Effect not possible (156-57) 166 | ||
The object comprehended by Memory (159-61) | 167 | |
The Past can never be the object of Sensuous Perception (161-62) | 167 | |
The Past Conception cannot be comprehended either as the Comprehended or the Comprehender (163-64) | 167 | |
A Conception cannot have the duplicate character of the Comprehender and the Comprehended (168-89) | 168 | |
Ideas appearing in the same series cannot have the relation of Canse and Effect, or that of impression and Impressed (171-72) | 168 | |
The Comprehended must be different from the Com prehender (174-75) 168 | ||
The Idea cannot comprehend itself (175-76) | 168 | |
No duplicate capability in Conceptions (177-79) | 169 | |
No Conception comprehended by itself (180-81) | 169 | |
Existence of Objects not explicable without Ideas (182) | 169 | |
An Idea always depends upon something else for its comprehension (184) | 170 | |
The Element of Remembrance in Subsequent Cognitions is mistaken (192) | 170 | |
Series of Cognitions explained (193) | 171 | |
Remembrance could not belong to every one of the Cognitions in a series (195) | 171 | |
Cognitions are not the objects of Conception (197) | 171 | |
Proximity and Relativity do not belong to Conceptions (200) | 172 | |
Cognitions appear even in the absence of Impressions and as such no causal efficiency belongs to these latter (203) | 172 | |
Incorrect Cognitions explained (207) | 173 | |
Forms ? dreamt of ? or otherwise ? cannot be attributed to Cognitions (209) | 173 | |
Falsity of Dream ? Cognition Explained (210) | 173 | |
Certain delusions explained (212-13) | 173 | |
Different Ideas with regard to the same object explained (214) | 174 | |
Comprehension of contradictory forms with regard to the same object explained (219) | 175 | |
In ordinary experience an External object is never cognised in the form of the Internal (229) | 176 | |
Reason for proving beforehand that the comprehension of the Object precedes that of the Idea (241) | 178 | |
No recognition of the Idea apart from the forms of Objects (246-47) | 179 | |
Specialities of Time and Place, & serve to explain all apparent discrepancies in comprehensions (253) | 180 | |
No agency of Vasana possible (256-58) | 180 | |
Absence of External Objects not proved by any of the recognised Pramanas (259-61) | 181 | |
Atoms not being comprehensible by themselves, their aggregates must be admitted to be the real objects of comprehension (262) | 181 | |
Section 5: Inference | 182-207 | |
There can be no doubt as to the validity of Inference as a means of Knowledge (1) | 182 | |
Definition of Inference explained (2) | 182 | |
The cognizance of Invariable Concomitance (12-13) | 183 | |
Grounds for the falsity of Ideas (18-19) | 184 | |
The object of Inference is the Minor Term as qualified by the Major Term (27) | 185 | |
The word 'asannikrshte' explained (55-56) 190 | ||
Contradiction of Sense ? perception explained (59-60) | 190 | |
Contradiction of Verbal Testimony (61-62) | 190 | |
Contradiction of Analogy (65-66) | 191 | |
Contradiction of Apparent Inconsistency (66-68) | 191 | |
The expression 'perception of one member' (in the Bhashya) explained (75-76) 192 | ||
Different forms of the contradiction of the Middle Term (79-80) | 193 | |
Reason and Doubt precluded from the Definition (83-85) | 193 | |
Canses of Doubt (83-85) | 193 | |
Viruddhata ? Contradictory character of the Middle Term ? explained (96) | 195 | |
Other Contradictions explained (101-102) | 196 | |
Similarity and Dissimilarity of the Predicate (107-108) | 197 | |
Discrepancies of the Instance (114-16) | 198 | |
Necessity of the recognition of the negative relationship of the Middle Term with the negative of the Major Term | 199 | |
Necessity of Negative Instances (131-32) | 200 | |
Real significance of the expression "Sense-perceived relation" (140-42) | 201 | |
Samanya as a Distinct Entity ? necessary for Inference (148-88) | 203 | |
The character and cognition of the Middle Term (163) | 204 | |
Any discrepancy in the perception of a 'samanya' destroys the cogency of all means of right notion (172) | 205 | |
Presence of Samanya in the visible objects also (181) | 206 | |
Section 6: On Words | 207 | |
Necessity of defining Verbal Authority in general (1-9) | 207 | |
Verbal Authority cannot be included in Inference (15) | 209 | |
Difference between the two processes (22-23) | 210 | |
Arguments in favour of the identity of both (35-37) | 212 | |
Various refutations of these Arguments (38) | 213 | |
Difference between ordinary human assertion and Scriptural declarations (47) | 213 | |
The Self-validity of Verbal Authority (53) | 214 | |
Verbal Authority not based on Inference (54-98) | ||
Necessity of accepting 'word' as an independent means of knowledge | 214 | |
Section 7 : Analogy | 222-232 | |
Operation of 'Analogy' explained (1-2) | 220 | |
The validity of 'Analogy' (4-5) | 223 | |
Similarity, a positive entity (18) | 225 | |
Different kind of Similarity (20) | 225 | |
Similarity something wholly different from the Properties on which it is based (21) | 225 | |
The Similarity of twins explained (22-23) | 226 | |
Similarity different from the classes (26) | 226 | |
Similarity amenable to Sense-perception (34) | 227 | |
It exists in its entirety in each member (35) | 227 | |
The object of Analogy (37) | 227 | |
This object not amenable to any other means of knowledge (38) | 227 | |
Semblances of Similarity (40) | 227 | |
Analogy is not Inference (43-44) | 228 | |
Use of Analogy as Distinct means of knowledge (52) | 229 | |
Section 8: Apparent Inconsistency | 230-43 | |
Case of the operation of Apparent Inconsistency | 230 | |
Example (2) | 230 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not the same as Inference (8-9) | 231 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not included in Negation (36) | 234 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not included in Verbal Authority (51) | 237 | |
The example not explicable by Sense-perception (60) | 238 | |
The example not explicable b Analogy (74) | 240 | |
Uses of Apparent Inconsistency in Mimansa (87) | 242 | |
Section 9: On Negation | 243-52 | |
Cases of the Operation of Negation as a Means of Knowledge (2) | 243 | |
Differences between Negation and Sense perception, (17) | 245 | |
The functioning of Negation purely Mental (27) | 247 | |
Difference between Negation and Inference (29) | 247 | |
Bauddha objection: "The Non-appearance of Sense perception, would form the Middle Term" -Reply to this (38-39) | 248 | |
How Negation can be a Means of Cognition (45) | 250 | |
Negation a distinct means of Cognition (54-55) | 251 | |
Other so-called Means of Cognition included in the six herein enumerated (57) | 251 | |
Section 10: On Citrakshepa | 252-54 | |
"The Citra Sacrifice cannot bring about cattle," &., and hence they are untrue (2-3) | 252 | |
The arguments in favour of this condemnation | 252 | |
From Analogy, the falsity shown to belong to the passages dealing with the Agnihotra, &c., also (15) | 254 | |
Section 11: On Sambandhakshepa | 254-261 | |
The truthful character of Vedic passages based upon their eternality (1) | 254 | |
Eternality of the relationship between Words and their Denotations (4-5) | 254 | |
Objections against this: no sort of relationship possible (6-10) | 255 | |
These objection met (11-12) | 255 | |
The different methods of the comprehension of this relationship (21-24) | 257 | |
"The words cannot have any denotativeness, prior to the recognition of the relationships" (33) | 259 | |
Such denotativeness shown by Usages (34) | 259 | |
The Cognition of the said relationship is only an accessory in the comprehension of the meanings of words (42) | 260 | |
"There cannot be any natural relationship between the Word and its signification" (45) | 261 | |
Section 12: On Sphota | 261-81 | |
Consideration of the nature of word (1) | 261 | |
Cognition of the word by means of Sense-perception (4) | 262 | |
The name 'Word' applicable, even before the comprehension of Meaning (8) | 262 | |
No Constituent parts of Letters (13) | 263 | |
The Letter Cognisable of Sense-perception (14) | 263 | |
There is only one individual of each Letter (15) | 263 | |
Diversity only apparent ? due to the diversity in the degrees of effort (25) | 265 | |
No such Class as 'gatva' possible (27) | 265 | |
No similar denial of the Class 'Cow' possible (35) | 266 | |
Perversities of Perception cannot affect our conclusions (41-44) | 268 | |
The expression 'Avarnakula' explained (49) | 269 | |
Accents are merely different forms belonging to the same Letter (57-58) | 270 | |
No such Class as 'gocabdatva' (66) | 272 | |
The idea of the sameness of the Word due to the identity of component letters (67) | 272 | |
Instance of gradual operations leading to a common result (74) | 273 | |
Applicability of the Present Tense to the functioning of the Word (80) | 274 | |
The whole Word can signify what its parts cannot (86) | 275 | |
Objection ? "No denotative potency inhering in the parts, these could be none in the whole" (87-88) | 275 | |
This objection applies to the Spheta theory also (91) | 275 | |
More Assumptions necessary for the Spheta theory than for the Mimansaka (94) | 276 | |
The Cognition of the last latter of the word is the cause of that of the meaning of the whole word (96) | 276 | |
No assumption of an intermediary Sanskara necessary (97) | 279 | |
The assumption of an imperceptible factor in the process is necessary for the Sphota theory also (104) | 277 | |
Simultaneity of letters composing a word may be admitted on the ground of their eternality and omnipresence (107) | 277 | |
Various theories as to the cognition of the Word as a whole (111) | 277 | |
Mental recognition of the word as one component whole admitted by all (113) | 277 | |
But the word as a whole cannot be cognised apart from the constituent letters (118) | 279 | |
The idea of the Word as one, explained (121) | 279 | |
The Sphota theory makes the agency of the words towards the denotation of its meaning, the subordinate factor (127) | 280 | |
The Sanskara, if any, must be regarded as forming part of the denotative process of the word (130) | 280 | |
The Sphota cannot indicate the meaning (133) | 280 | |
Section 13: On Akrti | 281-95 | |
Necessity of establishing the fact of the word denoting the Akrti (class) (1) | 281 | |
"Akrti" ? Class (3) | 282 | |
Commonality is necessary for the collective idea of a number of things (4) | 282 | |
All objects are recognised in two forms ? as Individuals, and as belonging to a class made up of certain other Individuals (5) | 282 | |
Mutual dependence between Class and Individual (9) | 283 | |
Both Class and Individual necessary | 283 | |
No such Class as 'Vastutva' (21-23) | 285 | |
Classes restricted to distinct individuals, through natural capabilities (28) | 286 | |
Relationship between Class and Individual purely natural (31-32) | 287 | |
Individuals do not signify Classes (34) | 287 | |
Without Class, verbal Testimony and Inference, &c., could not function as means of right knowledge (39) | 288 | |
The Class 'Cow' applies only to such animals as are endowed with the dewlap, &c., - explained (45) | 289 | |
Fixity of relation between class and Individuals based upon Direct Sense-perception (48) | 290 | |
The Class not identical with the Individual (52-55) | 291 | |
The Class as a whole is of Uniform Character (56-57) | 291 | |
Class does not consist of similarity among Individuals (65) | 293 | |
Section 14: On Apoha | 295-328 | |
There is no positive entity in the form of Negation (2) | 295 | |
The abstract forms of objects cannot be in the form of Negations (3) | 295 | |
All non-cows cannot be negative by an Individual Cow (5) | 296 | |
Partial Non-Negation not compatible with General Negation (7) | 296 | |
The generic property of 'cowness' is the only means of having an idea of cow in general (10) | 297 | |
Signification of "Non-Brahmanahood" explained as consisting of 'Manhood as apart from the Brahmanas' (18) 298 | ||
All negation rest in Positive Entities (35) | 301 | |
Usage not based upon Ultimate Entities ? like the Atom (36) | 301 | |
The idea with reference to the denotation of words always appears in the shape of a real positive entity (39) | 302 | |
We do not recognize any Ideas as mere Negations (41) | 302 | |
The Mimansaka's Classes being distinct positive entities, are different from another; the Apohist's Classes, in the form of Negations, must be identical with one another (44-45) | 303 | |
A postulating of differences among them would necessitate the admission of positive entities (46) | 304 | |
No diverse Apohas possible (50) | 304 | |
The Apohist could not distinguish the cow from the horse, - both being Negations of the Elephant (55) | 305 | |
No definite cognition of difference among Individual Animals possible for the Apohist (65-66) | 307 | |
Verbal testimony and Inference not applicable to the cause of Apoha, which is devoid of positive relationships (73-74) | 308 | |
The Rejection of Non-Cow would apply to the Cow as well as to the Horse (76) | 309 | |
Rejection of Non-Cow is not amenable the Senses or to Inference (78-79) | 310 | |
Persons not having any notions of Negation, are found to have ideas of the Cow: this fact not explicable by the Apohist (80) | 310 | |
The denotability of any object by 'Non-Cow' cannot be explained (81-82) | 311 | |
The admission of the cow as an independent positive entity, to serve as the object of the negation by Apoha; then the assumption of this latter would be absolutely useless (84-85) | 311 | |
Two negative entities cannot be related as the Container and the Contained (85-86) | 311 | |
How relationship possible between the Negative Apoha and a Positive Entity (86-87) | 311 | |
No cognition of Apoha actually found to be produced from such words as 'horse' and the like (88-89) | 312 | |
In the case of the word 'Entity' the Apoha could not but be in the form of the negation 'non-entity' ; and this double negative would constitute a Positive Entity (95-96) | 313 | |
No Vasana possible, with regard to a negative entity (100) | 313 | |
Apoha never actually cognised as significant (106-107) | 315 | |
No idea of Positivity possible with regard to the Apoha (113-14) | 316 | |
The Apohist cannot explain the relationship expressed by 'blue lotus' (115-17) | 316 | |
He could not explain the expression 'San ghatah' (121-22) | 317 | |
Apoha cannot form the denotation of words, because it refers to Individuals (128) | 319 | |
Specially as no such intervening factor as 'Apohavattva' is possible (129-30) | 319 | |
No implication of the Apoha possible (133) | 320 | |
No gender, &c., could apply to the Apoha (135) | 320 | |
The individual is not implied by the Apoha (136) | 320 | |
The Apohas of gender, &c., could not be the object of Specification (137) | 321 | |
In the case of Verbs, there is no notion of Negation (139) | 321 | |
There can be no negation in a double negative (140) | 321 | |
Mutual Interdependence involved in basing Apoha upon the mutual negation of objects (147) | 322 | |
Non-Negation of the Class cannot be postulated (149-50) | 322 | |
The Apohist cannot explain 'Rajnah purushah' (157) | 324 | |
A negation cannot have properties (163) | 324 | |
Naiyayika argument against Apoha not tenable (165) | 326 | |
Refutation of Apoha must be based upon usage (176) | 328 | |
Section 15: Vanavada | 329-47 | |
The parts of the Cow are related to the Class, through the Individual (1) | 329 | |
The parts are not Manifesters of the Class (4) | 329 | |
The bring about the Idea of the Class (7) | 330 | |
Various usages based upon ideas of Class (15) | 331 | |
Meaning of the word 'Akrti' (16) | 331 | |
It cannot mean shape (17) | 332 | |
Specification of Class due to peculiarities of colour, &c. (26-27) | 333 | |
Class inhering in each Individual is perceived by the Senses (30-31) | 334 | |
The Class manifested by the Individual (43) | 336 | |
The idea of "Cow" not based upon individual Cows (45) | 336 | |
Object of the Idea of "Cow" (46) | 337 | |
The Class 'Cow' is one only (47) | 337 | |
Idea of 'Cow' not based upon Similarity (48) | 337 | |
Single idea of class 'Cow' not false (49) | 337 | |
Citing of the instance of 'Forest' not irrelevant (50) | 337 | |
The idea of Singleness with reference to the 'Forest' explained ? First Explanation (55-62) | 339 | |
The single word 'Forest' can apply to a number of trees (64) | 341 | |
Second explanation of Singleness of Forest (63-69) 341 | ||
Other explanations of the Word 'vana' (66) | 341 | |
Third Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (69-70) | 341 | |
Fourth Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (70-71) | 343 | |
Substrate of the idea of 'Cow' (73-74) | 343 | |
Whole not absolutely different from its parts-as class not different from the constituent individuals (75-76) | 343 | |
The idea of 'Cow' not due to the conglomeration of the various parts of its body (82-83) | 345 | |
The Fact of words denoting one or many objects fixed by Convention (86-89) | 346 | |
Section 16: Sambandhakshepaparihara | 347-74 | |
Propriety of the introduction of the questions of the relationship of Word and Meaning (1) | 347 | |
Relationship of name and named cannot determine the comprehension of the meaning of the word (5) | 348 | |
Nor, is the relationship one of Invariable Concomitance (7) | 348 | |
The question of relationship has been brought forward with a view to the ascertainment of its eternality or non-eternality (10) | 349 | |
Denotation of words not based pimarily upon Conventional Rules (12) | 349 | |
The denotation of words based upon the Class (25-26) | 352 | |
The necessity of assuming Potency (29) | 353 | |
If the relation were not eternal, all men could not comprehend the word (30) | 353 | |
The process of the transference of the knowledge of world-relations (41) | 355 | |
This knowledge cannot be based upon Conventional Rules (42) | 355 | |
The world could have had no beginning in time (47) | 356 | |
No personal Creator of the world possible (47-59) | 356 | |
The Veda could not have proceeded from any Creator (61) | 358 | |
Explanation of those Vedic passages which speak of 'Creator' (61) | 358 | |
No proof for admitting a 'Pralaya' (68) | 359 | |
Arguments in favour of the Creative agency combated (74-86) | 360 | |
So functioning of Sankhya "Attributes" possible (87) | 360 | |
The bondage of soul not due to any actions lying latent in themselves (89) | 363 | |
The Knowledge cannot be the cause of Deliverance (94-106) | 364 | |
The Eternal Character of Deliverance based upon its Negative Character (107) | 367 | |
The nature of Deliverance (108) | 367 | |
Method of obtaining Deliverance (110) | 367 | |
The existence of a Creator is an untenable as that of an Omniscient Person (114-16) | 368 | |
The verbal relationship of the Proper Name (120) | 369 | |
The verbal relationship distinguished from those of Common Name (122-23) | 369 | |
Eternality of the relationship based upon the eternality of Words and Meanings (136-27) | 373 | |
Process of comprehending the Meaning of a Word (140-42) | 374 | |
Section 17: Citrakshepaparihara | 375-81 | |
Falsity of the premises brought forward against the theory of sacrifices bringing about results (1) | 375 | |
Passages laying down such result do not lay down immediateness of their appearance (2) | 375 | |
The non-applicability of Sense-perception does not vitiate the validity of Verbal Authority (4-5) | 379 | |
Even in ordinary actions results do not follow immediately after them (7) | 377 | |
The fact of only some people possessing cattle, shows that it is the result of the Citra Sacrifice performed by them in their previous birth (13) | 378 | |
Results not due to mere chance (18) | 379 | |
The Naiyayika theory of immediate sequence of the result as untenable as the "Chance" theory (22) | 380 | |
The non-appearance of the results due to impediment in their appearance (26) | 381 | |
Section 18: Atmavada | 382 | |
The Soul connected with the sacrificial implements, through the Body (1) | 382 | |
Denial of Soul makes the whole Veda open to objection (3) | 382 | |
The Soul is different from the Body and is eternal (7) | 383 | |
Objections against the eternality of the Soul (8) | 383 | |
Reply to above (13) | 384 | |
People are always cognizant of the fact of a certain result as appearing from a certain action (15) | 384 | |
The Soul's liability to modification does not mean its destruction (22) | 385 | |
No absolute destruction of the Soul is possible (23) | 386 | |
The character of Doer and Enjoyer belong to the Person, the Soul continuing throughout the various modifications (29) | 387 | |
The "Series" of ideas as held by the Baudda not tenable (33) | 387 | |
It is not possible for mere "Ideas" to transfer themselves into another body at rebirth (59) | 392 | |
No intermediate subtle body is possible (62) | 393 | |
Even If such a body existed, no Ideas could enter into it (64) | 393 | |
Ideas cannot exist in the Sense-organs (68) | 394 | |
The first Idea of Man after birth cannot be proved to be the product of any foregoing idea (70) | 394 | |
A Person, or Soul, alone could bear within himself the potentialities of Idea (73) | 395 | |
Motion is not the only form of action: Hence Soul can be the performer of sacrifices (74) | 395 | |
The Person is the doer of all Beings and Ideas (76) | 395 | |
The Body, &c., could have no actions except, those that belonged to the Soul (78) | 396 | |
Even in regard to one and the same action, the operation of several Souls is not necessarily identical (85-86) | 397 | |
The Ego does not become affected by any action except his own (89) | 397 | |
In the case of the Measure laid down with reference to the sacrificial post, we must take it as referring to the size of his body (90) | 398 | |
The Vaceshika arguments for the existence of Soul put forward (92-101) | 398 | |
These arguments refuted by the Bauddha (101-106) | 400 | |
The arguments of the Bhashya: The soul is directly cognizable by the notion of 'I' (107) | 401 | |
Intelligence cannot belong to material things (111-12) | 401 | |
The knower cannot be a mere Idea (115-16) | 403 | |
The "Series" of Ideas cannot be the object of the recognitions of 'I' (120) 404 | ||
Impressions can bring about a recognition only in the case of the previous cognizing 'I' being the same as the present 'I' (124-25) 404 | ||
Such notions as 'I am fat' must be regarded as misconceptions (127) | 405 | |
The Sense-organs are always spoken of as different from 'I' (128) | 405 | |
The Idea of 'My Soul' is due to the Cognition being distinct from the Soul (130) | 405 | |
Refutation of arguments against the Existence of Soul (137-39) | 407 | |
In the Knowing of Soul, one must supplement the Veda with the Brahmanas (140) | 407 | |
The Soul is self-luminous (142): Hence it is not perceived by other Soul (143) | 407 | |
One Soul is cognised by another by as observance of its Actions (145) | 408 | |
The Soul is imperishable (147) | 408 | |
Sutras VI ? XXIII | 409-495 | |
On the Eternality Word | 409 | |
Reasons for insisting upon the eternality of Words(1, 2,) | 409 | |
A momentary word is incapable of affording any sense (3) | 409 | |
Objection against the eternality of words (Sutras 6-11) | 410-12 | |
Words are caused entites (and hence transient) (9) | 410 | |
Words are caused because there is a difference in the same word as pronounced by different persons (10) | 411 | |
They are not all-pervading (hence not eternal) (11) | 411 | |
They are caused because they are brought about by efforts (13) | 411 | |
Letters composing words are transient, as they undergo modifications (17) | 412 | |
They are transient, as their sound is capable of interception (18) | 412 | |
Reply to the above objection (Sutras 12-23) | 412 | |
All the above arguments are inconclusive (19-20) | 412 | |
The word is not accepted by all philosophers to be due to human efforts (20-22) | 413 | |
As Destruction also is uncaused, the argument urged in Sutra 6 becomes contradictory (29-30) | 414 | |
The perception of Akaca after an effort does not make it transitory (30-32) | 414 | |
Various interpretations of the 'non-eternality of the word' put forward and refuted | 415 | |
Though words have permanent existence, yet they are not always perceived, because of the absence of manifesting agencies (40) | 416 | |
It is by means of a Supersensuous power that the utterance imparts s Supersensuous faculty to the organ of hearing, and thereby it becomes the cause of the manifestation of the already-existing word (45) | 417 | |
The Utterance belongs to the Air, and not to the Organs (49-50) | 417 | |
Objections: The word being onluy a change in the Akaca of the ear, brought about buy utterance, must belong to the whole of it, and as such be all pervading (56-58) | 418 | |
Partial cognition of the word by some people only, is not possible (64-65) | 420 | |
Above objections answered: Diversity of auditory cognition is due to the diversity in the Ears (65-66) | 420 | |
The Ear is not identical with Akaca (66-67) | 420 | |
The organic change takes place in the physical substratum (the tympanum of the ear) | 420 | |
The cognition taking place in the bodily organs, one man's cognition does not imply cognition by all men (73-75) | 421 | |
Similarly one man's deafness does not imply deafness of all men (76-77) | 422 | |
Similarity of conditions between the Nyaya theory of the Production of words and the Mimansa theory of their manifestation | 423 | |
Method of Word-cognition explained: the Vaiceshika view (88-90) | 423 | |
Objection to the Vaiseshika view (90-106) | 424 | |
The Sankhya and Jaina views stated and refuted (106-121) | 426 | |
The Mimansaka view explained (121-30) | 429 | |
What is Cravanendriya? (130-134) | 430 | |
The argument propounded in Sutra 7, against Eternality of words found to be inconclusive (155) | 434 | |
Objections in Sutra 8, met by Sutra 14 (157) | 434 | |
Explanation of Sutra 15 (163): answer to Sutra 9 | 435 | |
Explanation of Sutra 16 (201) | 443 | |
Explanation of Sutra 17: answer to Sutra 11 (211) | 445 | |
Explanation of Sutra 18: Eternality of Words (230) | 448 | |
The arrangement of letters in words is not 'caused' (288) | 460 | |
'Shortness,' 'Length,' &c., of vowel-sounds only mark divisions of time (303) | 463 | |
What do you mean by 'Non-eternality' in the case of words? (327): objections | 466 | |
Necessity of asserting 'eternality' of words (356) | 470 | |
It is necessary as it implies the eternality of (relations) | 470 | |
'Idea' and 'Action' as eternal as the class 'word' and class 'action' (398) | 477 | |
Arguments against 'subtle destructions' (425) | 481 | |
Arguments against non-eternality, and for Eternality of words summed up (443) | 484 | |
Sutras XXIV ? XXVI. | ||
On Sentence | 486-552 | |
Objections against the Eternality of Sentences in general, and of the Veda in particular (1-110) | 486 | |
Reply to the above (110) | 504 | |
Further objections (168-181) | 514 | |
Answered (182-221) | 517 | |
Change of denotation of words explained (222-246) | 526 | |
Explanation of Bhavana (247-316) | 531 | |
Explanation of Vikalpa ?Option (317) | 542 | |
Explanation of Sutra 25 (340) | 546 | |
Sutras XXVII ? XXXII. | ||
The Veda not the work of an author | 553-555 |
The English translation of the Mimamsaslokavarttika, the magnumopus of Kumarilabhatta was prepared by Dr. Ganganath Jha and published by the Asiatic Society during 1900-1908. The work was long out of print. But the demand for the same persisted. The Society in its bicentenary year decided to issue a reprint of the same as a mark of respect to the learned translator who utilised both the Kasika of Sucaritamisra and the Nyayaratnakara of Parthasarathimisra, which ascertain the view of Kumarila. I am happy that the book is available again to our scholars and researches.
The word Mimasa more properly Purva Mimansa is applied to the system originally propounded by Jaimini. The other names given to this system are Pureakanda Karma Mimansa, Karmakanda, Yajnavidya, Adhvaramimansa, Dharmamimansa and so forth some people evern speak of it as the Dvadacalackshmi.
Inasmuch as the avowed object of this system is a consideration of Dharma it is commonly spoken of as Dharmanimansa of the Veda there are three sections or kandas. The Karmakanda the Upasanakanda and the juanankanda and it is only that portion of the Veda which is contained in the first of these that is dealt with in the purva mimansa and for this reason it is spoken of as purvukanda purvamimansa or karmamimansa. Though the karmakanda of the Veda treats of many such actions as sacrifice only. And for this reason people speak of this as yajnamimansa or Adhvara mimansa.
This consideration of dharma is found to consist of twelve parts and these parts have been put by Jaimini in the form of twelve Adhyayas and hence the system has come to be known by the name of Dvadacalaskshani.
For a detailed explanation of the subject matter of each Adhyaya and adhikaransa the render is referred to the Appendix.
While Chiefly dealing with these subjects Jaimini has in many places dealt with other things in connection with these. It is clear that all that is treated of by Jaimini is chiefly Vedic. In the work known as the Veda beginningless and authorless were found mentioned here and there at random many sacrifices offerings &c. and hence it was very difficult to understand and grasp the methods and procedure of the various sacrifices &c: Consequently at the time of the performance of a sacrifice at each step the performers would meet with serious doubts and difficulties. And all this difficulty has once for all been set aside by Jamini by means of the sutras dealt with here. And it was only after the Mimansa philosophy had been duly propounded that the path of karmakanda became easy.
At the very outset Jaimini divided the Vedic sentences into two kinds. The mantra and the Brahmana the former is now known as the Sauhita Rgveda samhita &c. there are many Brahmanas that we known as Upanishat the Brhadaranyaka and the ohandogya. Then again he proceeds to sub divide these two kinds into other sorts the Rk the sama and the yaju.
The definitions that he lays down for the differentiation of the mantra and the Brahmana are embodied in the sutras II -i-32 and 33 wherein it is said that which at the time of the performance of a sacrifice points out certain details in connection with it is called Mantra and the rest are called Brahmana. But the earlier author have distinctly declared that this definition of Mantra is only a tentative one as there are many Mantras that do not fulfill the conditions herein laid down and are yet called Mantras. The mantras in reality take the place of aphorisms dealing with sacrificial details and the Brahmanas are commentaries on them in fact they are frequently spoken of as such by Cankaracarya.
Rk Yajush and Sama are the three sub divisions of the said two divisions of the Veda. Among Mantras and Brahmanas that sentence wherein we have distinct divisions into feet is calle a Rk (Sutra II-i-35) the other names of which are Rca, Cloka, Mnatra the sentence that are capable of being sung are known as Sama (II-i-36) the rest are called yajush )II-i-37).
The text of the Mimansa philosophy is the most extensive of all the Sutras have twelve Adhyayas divided into sixty padas containing about 1,000 Sutras, dealing with 1,000 sections or Adhikaranas.
The word Adhikarana really means discussion Consideration Inquiry Investigation. In the Mimansa we find that each discussion is made up of five parts viz: (1) Vishaya the subject matter under consideration (2) vipaya or suncaya the doubt arising of the opponent and the arguments in support thereof (4) Uttara or Siddhanta the demonstrated conclusion (5) Sanguti Relevancy of the discussion with the particular context. Some author explain uttara as the arguments against the view of the opponent and instead of Sangati they have Nirmaya which then explain as siddhanta. This system of discussion is adopted more or less in all the Sanskrit philosophical systems.
The sutras are all arranged in the above order of discussion. But a mere reading of the Sutras does not afford us any idea as to where a discussions ends and another begins. For all these as also for a proper understanding of the Sutras themselves we have to fall back upon certain commentaries upon the sutras.
Of these commentaries and commentaries on commentaries we have an almost endless series. The oldest commentary on the sutras that is available now is the Bhashya by Cavara Svami (published in the bibliothen Indica) though we find this bhashya referring to other commentaries chief among which is the Vrtti of the revered Upavarsha. On the Bhashya we have the commentary of Kumarila Bhatta generally spoken of as Bhatta. This work is divided into three parts known under three different names (1) Clokavartika treating of the first the Tarka (polemical) Pada of the first adhyaya (published in the caukhambha sanskirt series Benares). (2) the Tantravartika dealing with the last three Padas of Adhyaya 1 and the whole of Adhyayas II and III (published in the Benares Sasnkrit series and being translated into English by the present translator) and (3) the Tuptika dealing with Adhyayas IV-XII (Published in the Benares Sanskrit Series ). On the first of these we know of two commentaries (1) the Kavika by sucarita Micra and (2) the Nyayaratnakara of parthasarathi Miera (published in the Caukhambha Sanskrit series Benares) extracts from these two commentaries have been put in as notes in the present work and (3) the Nyayasudha of Someovara Bhatta. On the second the only commentary we know of is the Nyayasudha generally known as Banaka by somevara Bhatta (in course of publication in the Caukhambha Sanskrit Series Benares) and on the third we have only one vartikabharana by Venkata dikshita the other the tantraratna cannot be spoken of as a commentary in the proper sense of the word as it is a semi independent commentary on the sutras themselves though here and therer taking up and explaining certain passages from the Bhashya and the Vartika. This closes the list of works indirectly dealing with the present work.
Sutra I. | ||
Subject-matter of the Treatise | 1-20 | |
Introduction (1) | 1 | |
Purpose of the Mimansa ? Castra (11) | 2 | |
Connection of the Castra (19) | 3 | |
Various interpretations of the opening passage of the Bhashya (26) | 4 | |
First Interpretation: Universal Explanation (28) | 4 | |
Second Interpretation: Censure (33) | 5 | |
Third Interpretation: Disavowal (37) | 5 | |
Fourth Interpretation: Specification (46-47) | 7 | |
Fifth Interpretation: Praise (59) | 10 | |
Sixth Interpretation: Objection to the use of the word 'atha' (60) | 10 | |
Meaning of the word 'atha' ? Sequence (61) | 10 | |
What is implied by this Sequence: Study of the Veda (69-70) | 11 | |
Other significations of the Sutra (78-82) | 13 | |
Preclusion of Studies other than that of the Veda (82) | 13 | |
Negation of the Bath before Investigation of Dharma (87-88) | 14 | |
Signification of the Bath (100-101) | 17 | |
Signification of the Bath word 'atah' (110) | 18 | |
Meaning of the word 'Dharmajijnasa (115-17) | 18 | |
The Usefulness of Investigation of Dharma (122) | 19 | |
Sutra II. | ||
Definition of Dharma | 21-66 | |
Authority or Means of knowing Dharma (1) | 21 | |
Meaning of the word 'Codana' (3) | 21 | |
Duplicate implication of the Sutra (3) | 22 | |
Authoritativeness of Word (5) | 22 | |
'Codana' = Word (7) | 22 | |
Significations of the word 'lakshana' (9-10) | 22 | |
The Character of Dharma lies not in the Sacrifice itself, but in its capacity of bringing about auspicious results (13) | 23 | |
Preclusion of all other Means of knowledge from the case of Dharma (16) | 24 | |
Authority of the Veda questioned (21) | 24 | |
Self-evident character of the Veda: Does authoritativeness lie in the conception itself, or is it extraneous? (33) | 26 | |
The theory of the extraneous characters of authoritativeness (38) | 27 | |
The theory refuted (47) | 28 | |
Notion of un-authoritativeness due to extraneous influences (53) | 29 | |
Three forms of un-authoritativeness (54) | 29 | |
Excellences of the source of words only serve to set aside the chances of un-authoritativeness (65-66) | 31 | |
Absence of an Author safeguards the Veda against all reproach (68) | 31 | |
Only human assertions dependent upon other Pramanas (71) | 32 | |
The authoritativeness of Pramanas does not lie in their compatiblity with one another (73) | 32 | |
The falsity of a Conception explained (86) | 33 | |
Inference not applicable to Veda (89) | 34 | |
Undisputed authority of the Veda (95-96) | 35 | |
Veda not due to human origin (97-98) | 35 | |
Falsity due to non-productiveness of conception (101-102) | 36 | |
'Pratyayita' explained (102-103) | 36 | |
Force of the word 'Va' (109-10) | 37 | |
No omniscient person (111) | 38 | |
Inference and Sense-perception not applicable to objects in the future (115) | 38 | |
Veda not the work of an Omniscient Author (120) | 39 | |
Scriptures composed by human beings not fully authoritative (122) | 39 | |
No grounds for assuming the existence of an omniscient person (132) | 41 | |
The character of the Veda itself does not lend support to the theory an Omniscient Author (149) | 43 | |
Absurdity incurred in denying the authority of the Veda (154) | 43 | |
The sentence 'Nanvavidusham,' explained (155) | 44 | |
The Buddhistic Scriptures false, because composed by human beings (169) | 46 | |
The sentence 'Nanu samanyatodrshtam explained (174-75) | 46 | |
The sentence 'Na, anyatwat' explained (175) | 47 | |
The sentence 'Na hi anyasya, explained (181-82) | 48 | |
Arguments in support of the authenticity of the Veda (184) | 48 | |
'Pratyakshastu, explained (187) | 49 | |
Full signification of the word 'Dharma' (190) | 49 | |
Other meanings refuted (195-96) | 50 | |
No Apurva apart from a potentiality of the Sacrifice (197) | 51 | |
Objections based upon the significance of the word 'Codana' (201) | 51 | |
Reply to these: Codana cannot be restricted to positive activity only (200) | 53 | |
Codana refers to Injunctions as well as Prohibitions (215-16) | 54 | |
Two kinds of consequences following from Sacrifices (221-22) | 54 | |
Action not prohibited cannot be sinful (232-33) | 57 | |
Result not always similar to the Action (235-36) | 57 | |
Vedic Injunctions and Prohibitions the only means of knowing Dharma and Adharma (242-43) | 59 | |
Utilitarian theory of Virtue not tenable (246-47) | 59 | |
Nor the 'Conscience' theory (247-48) | 59 | |
Sacrificial Slaughter not sinful (259) | 61 | |
'Cyena' sacrifice sinful, because resulting in the death of a person (267) | 62 | |
Interpretation of the Sutra justified (277-78) | 64 | |
Sutra III. | ||
Declaration of the subject-matter | 67 | |
Declaration of the subject-matter of the Treatise (1-2) | 67 | |
Sutra IV. | ||
Sense-perception not the means of knowing Dharma | 68-112 | |
The Sutra cannot be taken an embodying a definition of Sense-perception (1) | 68 | |
Change of reading proposed by the Vrtti, with a view to make it a regular definition (13) | 69 | |
Trae meaning of the Sutra (20) | 70 | |
Sense-perception not applicable to Dharma (36) | 73 | |
Necessity of the word 'sat' (36) | 73 | |
The particle 'sam' (38-39) | 74 | |
Functioning of the senses explained (44) | 74 | |
The words' purusha' and 'indriya' (52) | 76 | |
Buddhijanma,' (53-54) | 76 | |
Why Sense-perception is not applicable to Dharma (59) | 77 | |
Self-recognition not the true result of Pramana (79) | 80 | |
Inference, & preceded by Sense-perception (87) | 82 | |
Inference not applicable to Dharma (99) | 84 | |
Analogy not applicable to Dharma (100) | 85 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not applicable to Dharma (101-102) | 85 | |
Veda the only means of knowing Dharma (108) | 86 | |
Inference is based upon Sense-perception (111) | 87 | |
Vedanta theory controverted (114-116) | 87 | |
Abstract perception of an object (118-19) | 88 | |
Abstract ? How made Concrete (120) | 88 | |
Cognition of Class cannot be inferential (138) | 92 | |
Samavaya (148) | 94 | |
Mixed functioning of various sense-organs (159) | 96 | |
The numbers of Senses only Five (169) | 98 | |
Exclusive objects of the Senses-organs differentiated (170) | 98 | |
Cognition of objects not in the form of identification with their verbal expressions (172) | 98 | |
Cognition of objects independent of verbal expressions (176) | 99 | |
The class 'cow' not cognized always in the form of the word 'cow' (180) | 100 | |
Apparent identity of the Word, the Idea, and the Object explained (183) | 100 | |
Imposition of the form of the word on the object is impossible (183) | 101 | |
Words not independent of the material forms of objects (193) | 102 | |
In the expression 'blue lotus,' there can be no absolute non-difference between a particular blueness and a particular lotus (197) | 103 | |
Another reason against the imposition of the forms of words upon objects (200) | 104 | |
Until the object is known, the Word cannot give any idea of it (203) | 105 | |
Objects do not depend upon words (205) | 105 | |
It is the form of the object that is cognised through the Word, which cannot suppress it (206) | 105 | |
If verbal forms were imposed upon words, the meaning of the word 'hasta' would differ from that of the word 'kara' (203) | 105 | |
The Imposition theory would falsify all Inference and Verbal Testimony (213) | 106 | |
The form of the Object not dependent upon Word (215) | 106 | |
The relationship between Words and Objects it eternal (219) | 106 | |
In the case of Proper Names also, the words are eternal: it is only their particular application that has a beginning in time (224) | 108 | |
Denotativeness of words not always due to Convention (226) | 108 | |
Conventional restriction explained (228) | 109 | |
The factors of Memory and Perception explained (230-31) | 109 | |
Sense-perception precisely explained (236-37) | 110 | |
Cognitions undefined only so long as words are not found (245-46) | 111 | |
It is the Classes of Objects and their various relationships (as expressed in inferential arguments) that are amenable to Sense-perception, which would not be possible if Perceptive Cognition were always undefined (247-48) | 111 | |
The name of 'Sense-perception' applicable to only such cognitions as follow directly from Sense-contact (255) | 112 | |
Sutra V. | ||
Authoritativeness of Injunction | 113-408 | |
Section 1: Vartika proper on the Sutra | 112-16 | |
Dharma not amenable to any other Means of Knowledge (2) | 113 | |
Injunction, the only means of knowing it (8) | 114 | |
Necessity of having recourse to Injunction (14) | 115 | |
Section 2: Introduction to the Vrtti on the Sutra | 116-19 | |
Transposition of the words 'tat' and 'sat' in Sutra (4), makes it a definition of Sense-perception (19-20) | 116 | |
Section 3: Nirdlambanavada | 119-48 | |
Necessity of the Discussion (1-3) | 119 | |
Reality of External Objects (4) | 119 | |
'Samurti Reality' synonymous with 'falsity' (8-9) | 120 | |
Pleasures of Heaven not similar to Dreams (11) | 120 | |
Diversity of opinion among various scions of the Bauddhas (14-16) | 120 | |
Two kinds of Denial of External Objects (17-18) | 121 | |
The Idealistic Position Expounded (20-22) | 121 | |
The Reply given by the Bhashya held by some people to be inadequate (28-29) | 123 | |
The Reply otherwise explained (30) | 123 | |
Necessity of the Reality of the External Word (32) | 123 | |
Denial of the Reality of Conceptions renders even the Bauddha tenet untenable (34) | 124 | |
Impossibility of Inference, if objects not real (35) | 124 | |
Denial of the reality of external objects is self-contradictory (53) | 127 | |
Superfluity of the Idealistic Argument (60) | 128 | |
Cognitions are without substratum only at the time of their actual appearance (63) | 129 | |
If Cognitions were always without substratum they would never be amenable to Inferential Argumentation (65-66) | 129 | |
Universally recognised Distinctions between Virtue and Vice, Teacher and Pupil, &, would not be possible, if there were no reality in objects (72-73) | 130 | |
Idealism contradicted by facts of ordinary experience (74) | 130 | |
If all Ideas are false, there is universal negation (74-75) | 130 | |
Counter-argument against Idealism (79-80) | 131 | |
Certain self-contradictions in the Idealistic theory (81-82) | 132 | |
If idealism be accepted, all systems of Philosophy are equally false (85-87) | 133 | |
There could be no distinction between false dream cognition and true waking cognition, both being equally unreal (88-89) | 133 | |
No Yogic faculty can supply the necessary explanation (93-94) | 132 | |
Another self-contradiction in the Idealistic theory (99-100) | 135 | |
The Middle Term of the Idealistic Argument is one that is not recognised by the other party (101-102) | 135 | |
The Middle Term of the Argument contradictory and the Instance incompatible (106-107) | 136 | |
The causes of certain common delusions explained (109-13) | 137 | |
Only mistaken cognitions can be said to be devoid of real substratum (117-19) | 138 | |
No Instance of Dissimilarity mentioned in the Idealistic Argument (121-22) | 138 | |
The Mention of such an Instance would involve a double negation, ie., an affirmation ? which would be impossible if no objects existed (124-25) | 139 | |
A reasoning to be effective must be acceptable to both parties (130-31) | 140 | |
The Argument brought forward by the Idealist should contain nothing that he does not accept to be true (143) | 141 | |
That which is now held to be unreal could never have been real (156) | 142 | |
No reality can proceed from a reasoning that is unreal (159) | 142 | |
The Chief Elements in the reasoning of the Idealist are admittedly unreal (163) | 143 | |
Worldly activity not explicable by mere Idea (169) | 143 | |
No specification of Vasana Possible (178-79) | 144 | |
No proof for the existence of Vasana (180-81) | 144 | |
Vasanas, even if extant, could never bring about effects in a serial order (192-93) | 146 | |
It is only a permanent soul that can serve as the substratum of Vasanas (199-200) | 147 | |
Buddha propounded the Idealsitic theory with the sole view of turning the minds of men away from wordly objects (202) | 148 | |
Section 4: Cunyavada | 148-82 | |
Inferential Idealistic arguments expounded in detail (2-63) | ||
No difference between the shape of the Cognition and the Cognised (6) | 148 | |
It is only that which is Cognised that can have an existence (7) | 148 | |
The Shape cognised cannot belong to the external object (9) | 149 | |
The character of the Cogniser cannot be attributed to the Object (13) | 149 | |
The real character of Cognitions is absolutely pure, and it is only ever-continuing Vasanas that make it appear in diverse forms (15-17) | 149 | |
Another reason for attributing the form to Cognitions (21) | 150 | |
Otherwise the Cognition could not appear prior to the comprehension of the Objects (25) | 150 | |
Third Argument to show that the form belongs to Cognitions (32) | 151 | |
The form of the Object cannot be said to be imposed upon the Cognition (35) | 151 | |
The form cannot be held to be a property of the contact of the Cognition with the Object (42) | 152 | |
Any such Contact not possible in the case (43) | 152 | |
The Idea and the Object both cannot have the same form (55) | 153 | |
Refutation of the above arguments (64-263) | ||
Idea cannot be both the Cogniser and the Cognised (64) | 154 | |
The case of Self is different ? It can be both ? This fact explained (67) | 155 | |
There is often an idea of the Cognisable Object without that of the Cognising Idea (79) | 156 | |
The comprehension of the Object alone, or of te Idea alone, cannot be explained on the mere ground of Capability or Incapability (95) | 158 | |
The difference between Object and Idea not one of Time and Form only (100) | 159 | |
Predicability and Knowability explained (103) | 159 | |
No absolute difference between any two objects (105) | 160 | |
Cognition being one, the difference in conceptions is due to a diversity among objects (116) | 161 | |
A single object never cognised as both Comprehender and Comprehended (120) | 161 | |
Duality of Existence ? Comprehender and Comprehended ? fully established (129) | 163 | |
No Apoha possible (136) | 164 | |
Reasons against the assumption of Apoha (137) | 164 | |
The character of Idea belongs to the Comprehender only (148-49) | 165 | |
Ideas cannot have, among themselves, the relation of the Conceived and the Means of Conception (149-50) | 165 | |
Peculiar causal relationship between the Object and the Idea (151-52) | 166 | |
Their sequence does not constitute causality (154-55) | 166 | |
Simultaneity of Cause and Effect not possible (156-57) 166 | ||
The object comprehended by Memory (159-61) | 167 | |
The Past can never be the object of Sensuous Perception (161-62) | 167 | |
The Past Conception cannot be comprehended either as the Comprehended or the Comprehender (163-64) | 167 | |
A Conception cannot have the duplicate character of the Comprehender and the Comprehended (168-89) | 168 | |
Ideas appearing in the same series cannot have the relation of Canse and Effect, or that of impression and Impressed (171-72) | 168 | |
The Comprehended must be different from the Com prehender (174-75) 168 | ||
The Idea cannot comprehend itself (175-76) | 168 | |
No duplicate capability in Conceptions (177-79) | 169 | |
No Conception comprehended by itself (180-81) | 169 | |
Existence of Objects not explicable without Ideas (182) | 169 | |
An Idea always depends upon something else for its comprehension (184) | 170 | |
The Element of Remembrance in Subsequent Cognitions is mistaken (192) | 170 | |
Series of Cognitions explained (193) | 171 | |
Remembrance could not belong to every one of the Cognitions in a series (195) | 171 | |
Cognitions are not the objects of Conception (197) | 171 | |
Proximity and Relativity do not belong to Conceptions (200) | 172 | |
Cognitions appear even in the absence of Impressions and as such no causal efficiency belongs to these latter (203) | 172 | |
Incorrect Cognitions explained (207) | 173 | |
Forms ? dreamt of ? or otherwise ? cannot be attributed to Cognitions (209) | 173 | |
Falsity of Dream ? Cognition Explained (210) | 173 | |
Certain delusions explained (212-13) | 173 | |
Different Ideas with regard to the same object explained (214) | 174 | |
Comprehension of contradictory forms with regard to the same object explained (219) | 175 | |
In ordinary experience an External object is never cognised in the form of the Internal (229) | 176 | |
Reason for proving beforehand that the comprehension of the Object precedes that of the Idea (241) | 178 | |
No recognition of the Idea apart from the forms of Objects (246-47) | 179 | |
Specialities of Time and Place, & serve to explain all apparent discrepancies in comprehensions (253) | 180 | |
No agency of Vasana possible (256-58) | 180 | |
Absence of External Objects not proved by any of the recognised Pramanas (259-61) | 181 | |
Atoms not being comprehensible by themselves, their aggregates must be admitted to be the real objects of comprehension (262) | 181 | |
Section 5: Inference | 182-207 | |
There can be no doubt as to the validity of Inference as a means of Knowledge (1) | 182 | |
Definition of Inference explained (2) | 182 | |
The cognizance of Invariable Concomitance (12-13) | 183 | |
Grounds for the falsity of Ideas (18-19) | 184 | |
The object of Inference is the Minor Term as qualified by the Major Term (27) | 185 | |
The word 'asannikrshte' explained (55-56) 190 | ||
Contradiction of Sense ? perception explained (59-60) | 190 | |
Contradiction of Verbal Testimony (61-62) | 190 | |
Contradiction of Analogy (65-66) | 191 | |
Contradiction of Apparent Inconsistency (66-68) | 191 | |
The expression 'perception of one member' (in the Bhashya) explained (75-76) 192 | ||
Different forms of the contradiction of the Middle Term (79-80) | 193 | |
Reason and Doubt precluded from the Definition (83-85) | 193 | |
Canses of Doubt (83-85) | 193 | |
Viruddhata ? Contradictory character of the Middle Term ? explained (96) | 195 | |
Other Contradictions explained (101-102) | 196 | |
Similarity and Dissimilarity of the Predicate (107-108) | 197 | |
Discrepancies of the Instance (114-16) | 198 | |
Necessity of the recognition of the negative relationship of the Middle Term with the negative of the Major Term | 199 | |
Necessity of Negative Instances (131-32) | 200 | |
Real significance of the expression "Sense-perceived relation" (140-42) | 201 | |
Samanya as a Distinct Entity ? necessary for Inference (148-88) | 203 | |
The character and cognition of the Middle Term (163) | 204 | |
Any discrepancy in the perception of a 'samanya' destroys the cogency of all means of right notion (172) | 205 | |
Presence of Samanya in the visible objects also (181) | 206 | |
Section 6: On Words | 207 | |
Necessity of defining Verbal Authority in general (1-9) | 207 | |
Verbal Authority cannot be included in Inference (15) | 209 | |
Difference between the two processes (22-23) | 210 | |
Arguments in favour of the identity of both (35-37) | 212 | |
Various refutations of these Arguments (38) | 213 | |
Difference between ordinary human assertion and Scriptural declarations (47) | 213 | |
The Self-validity of Verbal Authority (53) | 214 | |
Verbal Authority not based on Inference (54-98) | ||
Necessity of accepting 'word' as an independent means of knowledge | 214 | |
Section 7 : Analogy | 222-232 | |
Operation of 'Analogy' explained (1-2) | 220 | |
The validity of 'Analogy' (4-5) | 223 | |
Similarity, a positive entity (18) | 225 | |
Different kind of Similarity (20) | 225 | |
Similarity something wholly different from the Properties on which it is based (21) | 225 | |
The Similarity of twins explained (22-23) | 226 | |
Similarity different from the classes (26) | 226 | |
Similarity amenable to Sense-perception (34) | 227 | |
It exists in its entirety in each member (35) | 227 | |
The object of Analogy (37) | 227 | |
This object not amenable to any other means of knowledge (38) | 227 | |
Semblances of Similarity (40) | 227 | |
Analogy is not Inference (43-44) | 228 | |
Use of Analogy as Distinct means of knowledge (52) | 229 | |
Section 8: Apparent Inconsistency | 230-43 | |
Case of the operation of Apparent Inconsistency | 230 | |
Example (2) | 230 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not the same as Inference (8-9) | 231 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not included in Negation (36) | 234 | |
Apparent Inconsistency not included in Verbal Authority (51) | 237 | |
The example not explicable by Sense-perception (60) | 238 | |
The example not explicable b Analogy (74) | 240 | |
Uses of Apparent Inconsistency in Mimansa (87) | 242 | |
Section 9: On Negation | 243-52 | |
Cases of the Operation of Negation as a Means of Knowledge (2) | 243 | |
Differences between Negation and Sense perception, (17) | 245 | |
The functioning of Negation purely Mental (27) | 247 | |
Difference between Negation and Inference (29) | 247 | |
Bauddha objection: "The Non-appearance of Sense perception, would form the Middle Term" -Reply to this (38-39) | 248 | |
How Negation can be a Means of Cognition (45) | 250 | |
Negation a distinct means of Cognition (54-55) | 251 | |
Other so-called Means of Cognition included in the six herein enumerated (57) | 251 | |
Section 10: On Citrakshepa | 252-54 | |
"The Citra Sacrifice cannot bring about cattle," &., and hence they are untrue (2-3) | 252 | |
The arguments in favour of this condemnation | 252 | |
From Analogy, the falsity shown to belong to the passages dealing with the Agnihotra, &c., also (15) | 254 | |
Section 11: On Sambandhakshepa | 254-261 | |
The truthful character of Vedic passages based upon their eternality (1) | 254 | |
Eternality of the relationship between Words and their Denotations (4-5) | 254 | |
Objections against this: no sort of relationship possible (6-10) | 255 | |
These objection met (11-12) | 255 | |
The different methods of the comprehension of this relationship (21-24) | 257 | |
"The words cannot have any denotativeness, prior to the recognition of the relationships" (33) | 259 | |
Such denotativeness shown by Usages (34) | 259 | |
The Cognition of the said relationship is only an accessory in the comprehension of the meanings of words (42) | 260 | |
"There cannot be any natural relationship between the Word and its signification" (45) | 261 | |
Section 12: On Sphota | 261-81 | |
Consideration of the nature of word (1) | 261 | |
Cognition of the word by means of Sense-perception (4) | 262 | |
The name 'Word' applicable, even before the comprehension of Meaning (8) | 262 | |
No Constituent parts of Letters (13) | 263 | |
The Letter Cognisable of Sense-perception (14) | 263 | |
There is only one individual of each Letter (15) | 263 | |
Diversity only apparent ? due to the diversity in the degrees of effort (25) | 265 | |
No such Class as 'gatva' possible (27) | 265 | |
No similar denial of the Class 'Cow' possible (35) | 266 | |
Perversities of Perception cannot affect our conclusions (41-44) | 268 | |
The expression 'Avarnakula' explained (49) | 269 | |
Accents are merely different forms belonging to the same Letter (57-58) | 270 | |
No such Class as 'gocabdatva' (66) | 272 | |
The idea of the sameness of the Word due to the identity of component letters (67) | 272 | |
Instance of gradual operations leading to a common result (74) | 273 | |
Applicability of the Present Tense to the functioning of the Word (80) | 274 | |
The whole Word can signify what its parts cannot (86) | 275 | |
Objection ? "No denotative potency inhering in the parts, these could be none in the whole" (87-88) | 275 | |
This objection applies to the Spheta theory also (91) | 275 | |
More Assumptions necessary for the Spheta theory than for the Mimansaka (94) | 276 | |
The Cognition of the last latter of the word is the cause of that of the meaning of the whole word (96) | 276 | |
No assumption of an intermediary Sanskara necessary (97) | 279 | |
The assumption of an imperceptible factor in the process is necessary for the Sphota theory also (104) | 277 | |
Simultaneity of letters composing a word may be admitted on the ground of their eternality and omnipresence (107) | 277 | |
Various theories as to the cognition of the Word as a whole (111) | 277 | |
Mental recognition of the word as one component whole admitted by all (113) | 277 | |
But the word as a whole cannot be cognised apart from the constituent letters (118) | 279 | |
The idea of the Word as one, explained (121) | 279 | |
The Sphota theory makes the agency of the words towards the denotation of its meaning, the subordinate factor (127) | 280 | |
The Sanskara, if any, must be regarded as forming part of the denotative process of the word (130) | 280 | |
The Sphota cannot indicate the meaning (133) | 280 | |
Section 13: On Akrti | 281-95 | |
Necessity of establishing the fact of the word denoting the Akrti (class) (1) | 281 | |
"Akrti" ? Class (3) | 282 | |
Commonality is necessary for the collective idea of a number of things (4) | 282 | |
All objects are recognised in two forms ? as Individuals, and as belonging to a class made up of certain other Individuals (5) | 282 | |
Mutual dependence between Class and Individual (9) | 283 | |
Both Class and Individual necessary | 283 | |
No such Class as 'Vastutva' (21-23) | 285 | |
Classes restricted to distinct individuals, through natural capabilities (28) | 286 | |
Relationship between Class and Individual purely natural (31-32) | 287 | |
Individuals do not signify Classes (34) | 287 | |
Without Class, verbal Testimony and Inference, &c., could not function as means of right knowledge (39) | 288 | |
The Class 'Cow' applies only to such animals as are endowed with the dewlap, &c., - explained (45) | 289 | |
Fixity of relation between class and Individuals based upon Direct Sense-perception (48) | 290 | |
The Class not identical with the Individual (52-55) | 291 | |
The Class as a whole is of Uniform Character (56-57) | 291 | |
Class does not consist of similarity among Individuals (65) | 293 | |
Section 14: On Apoha | 295-328 | |
There is no positive entity in the form of Negation (2) | 295 | |
The abstract forms of objects cannot be in the form of Negations (3) | 295 | |
All non-cows cannot be negative by an Individual Cow (5) | 296 | |
Partial Non-Negation not compatible with General Negation (7) | 296 | |
The generic property of 'cowness' is the only means of having an idea of cow in general (10) | 297 | |
Signification of "Non-Brahmanahood" explained as consisting of 'Manhood as apart from the Brahmanas' (18) 298 | ||
All negation rest in Positive Entities (35) | 301 | |
Usage not based upon Ultimate Entities ? like the Atom (36) | 301 | |
The idea with reference to the denotation of words always appears in the shape of a real positive entity (39) | 302 | |
We do not recognize any Ideas as mere Negations (41) | 302 | |
The Mimansaka's Classes being distinct positive entities, are different from another; the Apohist's Classes, in the form of Negations, must be identical with one another (44-45) | 303 | |
A postulating of differences among them would necessitate the admission of positive entities (46) | 304 | |
No diverse Apohas possible (50) | 304 | |
The Apohist could not distinguish the cow from the horse, - both being Negations of the Elephant (55) | 305 | |
No definite cognition of difference among Individual Animals possible for the Apohist (65-66) | 307 | |
Verbal testimony and Inference not applicable to the cause of Apoha, which is devoid of positive relationships (73-74) | 308 | |
The Rejection of Non-Cow would apply to the Cow as well as to the Horse (76) | 309 | |
Rejection of Non-Cow is not amenable the Senses or to Inference (78-79) | 310 | |
Persons not having any notions of Negation, are found to have ideas of the Cow: this fact not explicable by the Apohist (80) | 310 | |
The denotability of any object by 'Non-Cow' cannot be explained (81-82) | 311 | |
The admission of the cow as an independent positive entity, to serve as the object of the negation by Apoha; then the assumption of this latter would be absolutely useless (84-85) | 311 | |
Two negative entities cannot be related as the Container and the Contained (85-86) | 311 | |
How relationship possible between the Negative Apoha and a Positive Entity (86-87) | 311 | |
No cognition of Apoha actually found to be produced from such words as 'horse' and the like (88-89) | 312 | |
In the case of the word 'Entity' the Apoha could not but be in the form of the negation 'non-entity' ; and this double negative would constitute a Positive Entity (95-96) | 313 | |
No Vasana possible, with regard to a negative entity (100) | 313 | |
Apoha never actually cognised as significant (106-107) | 315 | |
No idea of Positivity possible with regard to the Apoha (113-14) | 316 | |
The Apohist cannot explain the relationship expressed by 'blue lotus' (115-17) | 316 | |
He could not explain the expression 'San ghatah' (121-22) | 317 | |
Apoha cannot form the denotation of words, because it refers to Individuals (128) | 319 | |
Specially as no such intervening factor as 'Apohavattva' is possible (129-30) | 319 | |
No implication of the Apoha possible (133) | 320 | |
No gender, &c., could apply to the Apoha (135) | 320 | |
The individual is not implied by the Apoha (136) | 320 | |
The Apohas of gender, &c., could not be the object of Specification (137) | 321 | |
In the case of Verbs, there is no notion of Negation (139) | 321 | |
There can be no negation in a double negative (140) | 321 | |
Mutual Interdependence involved in basing Apoha upon the mutual negation of objects (147) | 322 | |
Non-Negation of the Class cannot be postulated (149-50) | 322 | |
The Apohist cannot explain 'Rajnah purushah' (157) | 324 | |
A negation cannot have properties (163) | 324 | |
Naiyayika argument against Apoha not tenable (165) | 326 | |
Refutation of Apoha must be based upon usage (176) | 328 | |
Section 15: Vanavada | 329-47 | |
The parts of the Cow are related to the Class, through the Individual (1) | 329 | |
The parts are not Manifesters of the Class (4) | 329 | |
The bring about the Idea of the Class (7) | 330 | |
Various usages based upon ideas of Class (15) | 331 | |
Meaning of the word 'Akrti' (16) | 331 | |
It cannot mean shape (17) | 332 | |
Specification of Class due to peculiarities of colour, &c. (26-27) | 333 | |
Class inhering in each Individual is perceived by the Senses (30-31) | 334 | |
The Class manifested by the Individual (43) | 336 | |
The idea of "Cow" not based upon individual Cows (45) | 336 | |
Object of the Idea of "Cow" (46) | 337 | |
The Class 'Cow' is one only (47) | 337 | |
Idea of 'Cow' not based upon Similarity (48) | 337 | |
Single idea of class 'Cow' not false (49) | 337 | |
Citing of the instance of 'Forest' not irrelevant (50) | 337 | |
The idea of Singleness with reference to the 'Forest' explained ? First Explanation (55-62) | 339 | |
The single word 'Forest' can apply to a number of trees (64) | 341 | |
Second explanation of Singleness of Forest (63-69) 341 | ||
Other explanations of the Word 'vana' (66) | 341 | |
Third Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (69-70) | 341 | |
Fourth Explanation of the singleness of 'Forest' (70-71) | 343 | |
Substrate of the idea of 'Cow' (73-74) | 343 | |
Whole not absolutely different from its parts-as class not different from the constituent individuals (75-76) | 343 | |
The idea of 'Cow' not due to the conglomeration of the various parts of its body (82-83) | 345 | |
The Fact of words denoting one or many objects fixed by Convention (86-89) | 346 | |
Section 16: Sambandhakshepaparihara | 347-74 | |
Propriety of the introduction of the questions of the relationship of Word and Meaning (1) | 347 | |
Relationship of name and named cannot determine the comprehension of the meaning of the word (5) | 348 | |
Nor, is the relationship one of Invariable Concomitance (7) | 348 | |
The question of relationship has been brought forward with a view to the ascertainment of its eternality or non-eternality (10) | 349 | |
Denotation of words not based pimarily upon Conventional Rules (12) | 349 | |
The denotation of words based upon the Class (25-26) | 352 | |
The necessity of assuming Potency (29) | 353 | |
If the relation were not eternal, all men could not comprehend the word (30) | 353 | |
The process of the transference of the knowledge of world-relations (41) | 355 | |
This knowledge cannot be based upon Conventional Rules (42) | 355 | |
The world could have had no beginning in time (47) | 356 | |
No personal Creator of the world possible (47-59) | 356 | |
The Veda could not have proceeded from any Creator (61) | 358 | |
Explanation of those Vedic passages which speak of 'Creator' (61) | 358 | |
No proof for admitting a 'Pralaya' (68) | 359 | |
Arguments in favour of the Creative agency combated (74-86) | 360 | |
So functioning of Sankhya "Attributes" possible (87) | 360 | |
The bondage of soul not due to any actions lying latent in themselves (89) | 363 | |
The Knowledge cannot be the cause of Deliverance (94-106) | 364 | |
The Eternal Character of Deliverance based upon its Negative Character (107) | 367 | |
The nature of Deliverance (108) | 367 | |
Method of obtaining Deliverance (110) | 367 | |
The existence of a Creator is an untenable as that of an Omniscient Person (114-16) | 368 | |
The verbal relationship of the Proper Name (120) | 369 | |
The verbal relationship distinguished from those of Common Name (122-23) | 369 | |
Eternality of the relationship based upon the eternality of Words and Meanings (136-27) | 373 | |
Process of comprehending the Meaning of a Word (140-42) | 374 | |
Section 17: Citrakshepaparihara | 375-81 | |
Falsity of the premises brought forward against the theory of sacrifices bringing about results (1) | 375 | |
Passages laying down such result do not lay down immediateness of their appearance (2) | 375 | |
The non-applicability of Sense-perception does not vitiate the validity of Verbal Authority (4-5) | 379 | |
Even in ordinary actions results do not follow immediately after them (7) | 377 | |
The fact of only some people possessing cattle, shows that it is the result of the Citra Sacrifice performed by them in their previous birth (13) | 378 | |
Results not due to mere chance (18) | 379 | |
The Naiyayika theory of immediate sequence of the result as untenable as the "Chance" theory (22) | 380 | |
The non-appearance of the results due to impediment in their appearance (26) | 381 | |
Section 18: Atmavada | 382 | |
The Soul connected with the sacrificial implements, through the Body (1) | 382 | |
Denial of Soul makes the whole Veda open to objection (3) | 382 | |
The Soul is different from the Body and is eternal (7) | 383 | |
Objections against the eternality of the Soul (8) | 383 | |
Reply to above (13) | 384 | |
People are always cognizant of the fact of a certain result as appearing from a certain action (15) | 384 | |
The Soul's liability to modification does not mean its destruction (22) | 385 | |
No absolute destruction of the Soul is possible (23) | 386 | |
The character of Doer and Enjoyer belong to the Person, the Soul continuing throughout the various modifications (29) | 387 | |
The "Series" of ideas as held by the Baudda not tenable (33) | 387 | |
It is not possible for mere "Ideas" to transfer themselves into another body at rebirth (59) | 392 | |
No intermediate subtle body is possible (62) | 393 | |
Even If such a body existed, no Ideas could enter into it (64) | 393 | |
Ideas cannot exist in the Sense-organs (68) | 394 | |
The first Idea of Man after birth cannot be proved to be the product of any foregoing idea (70) | 394 | |
A Person, or Soul, alone could bear within himself the potentialities of Idea (73) | 395 | |
Motion is not the only form of action: Hence Soul can be the performer of sacrifices (74) | 395 | |
The Person is the doer of all Beings and Ideas (76) | 395 | |
The Body, &c., could have no actions except, those that belonged to the Soul (78) | 396 | |
Even in regard to one and the same action, the operation of several Souls is not necessarily identical (85-86) | 397 | |
The Ego does not become affected by any action except his own (89) | 397 | |
In the case of the Measure laid down with reference to the sacrificial post, we must take it as referring to the size of his body (90) | 398 | |
The Vaceshika arguments for the existence of Soul put forward (92-101) | 398 | |
These arguments refuted by the Bauddha (101-106) | 400 | |
The arguments of the Bhashya: The soul is directly cognizable by the notion of 'I' (107) | 401 | |
Intelligence cannot belong to material things (111-12) | 401 | |
The knower cannot be a mere Idea (115-16) | 403 | |
The "Series" of Ideas cannot be the object of the recognitions of 'I' (120) 404 | ||
Impressions can bring about a recognition only in the case of the previous cognizing 'I' being the same as the present 'I' (124-25) 404 | ||
Such notions as 'I am fat' must be regarded as misconceptions (127) | 405 | |
The Sense-organs are always spoken of as different from 'I' (128) | 405 | |
The Idea of 'My Soul' is due to the Cognition being distinct from the Soul (130) | 405 | |
Refutation of arguments against the Existence of Soul (137-39) | 407 | |
In the Knowing of Soul, one must supplement the Veda with the Brahmanas (140) | 407 | |
The Soul is self-luminous (142): Hence it is not perceived by other Soul (143) | 407 | |
One Soul is cognised by another by as observance of its Actions (145) | 408 | |
The Soul is imperishable (147) | 408 | |
Sutras VI ? XXIII | 409-495 | |
On the Eternality Word | 409 | |
Reasons for insisting upon the eternality of Words(1, 2,) | 409 | |
A momentary word is incapable of affording any sense (3) | 409 | |
Objection against the eternality of words (Sutras 6-11) | 410-12 | |
Words are caused entites (and hence transient) (9) | 410 | |
Words are caused because there is a difference in the same word as pronounced by different persons (10) | 411 | |
They are not all-pervading (hence not eternal) (11) | 411 | |
They are caused because they are brought about by efforts (13) | 411 | |
Letters composing words are transient, as they undergo modifications (17) | 412 | |
They are transient, as their sound is capable of interception (18) | 412 | |
Reply to the above objection (Sutras 12-23) | 412 | |
All the above arguments are inconclusive (19-20) | 412 | |
The word is not accepted by all philosophers to be due to human efforts (20-22) | 413 | |
As Destruction also is uncaused, the argument urged in Sutra 6 becomes contradictory (29-30) | 414 | |
The perception of Akaca after an effort does not make it transitory (30-32) | 414 | |
Various interpretations of the 'non-eternality of the word' put forward and refuted | 415 | |
Though words have permanent existence, yet they are not always perceived, because of the absence of manifesting agencies (40) | 416 | |
It is by means of a Supersensuous power that the utterance imparts s Supersensuous faculty to the organ of hearing, and thereby it becomes the cause of the manifestation of the already-existing word (45) | 417 | |
The Utterance belongs to the Air, and not to the Organs (49-50) | 417 | |
Objections: The word being onluy a change in the Akaca of the ear, brought about buy utterance, must belong to the whole of it, and as such be all pervading (56-58) | 418 | |
Partial cognition of the word by some people only, is not possible (64-65) | 420 | |
Above objections answered: Diversity of auditory cognition is due to the diversity in the Ears (65-66) | 420 | |
The Ear is not identical with Akaca (66-67) | 420 | |
The organic change takes place in the physical substratum (the tympanum of the ear) | 420 | |
The cognition taking place in the bodily organs, one man's cognition does not imply cognition by all men (73-75) | 421 | |
Similarly one man's deafness does not imply deafness of all men (76-77) | 422 | |
Similarity of conditions between the Nyaya theory of the Production of words and the Mimansa theory of their manifestation | 423 | |
Method of Word-cognition explained: the Vaiceshika view (88-90) | 423 | |
Objection to the Vaiseshika view (90-106) | 424 | |
The Sankhya and Jaina views stated and refuted (106-121) | 426 | |
The Mimansaka view explained (121-30) | 429 | |
What is Cravanendriya? (130-134) | 430 | |
The argument propounded in Sutra 7, against Eternality of words found to be inconclusive (155) | 434 | |
Objections in Sutra 8, met by Sutra 14 (157) | 434 | |
Explanation of Sutra 15 (163): answer to Sutra 9 | 435 | |
Explanation of Sutra 16 (201) | 443 | |
Explanation of Sutra 17: answer to Sutra 11 (211) | 445 | |
Explanation of Sutra 18: Eternality of Words (230) | 448 | |
The arrangement of letters in words is not 'caused' (288) | 460 | |
'Shortness,' 'Length,' &c., of vowel-sounds only mark divisions of time (303) | 463 | |
What do you mean by 'Non-eternality' in the case of words? (327): objections | 466 | |
Necessity of asserting 'eternality' of words (356) | 470 | |
It is necessary as it implies the eternality of (relations) | 470 | |
'Idea' and 'Action' as eternal as the class 'word' and class 'action' (398) | 477 | |
Arguments against 'subtle destructions' (425) | 481 | |
Arguments against non-eternality, and for Eternality of words summed up (443) | 484 | |
Sutras XXIV ? XXVI. | ||
On Sentence | 486-552 | |
Objections against the Eternality of Sentences in general, and of the Veda in particular (1-110) | 486 | |
Reply to the above (110) | 504 | |
Further objections (168-181) | 514 | |
Answered (182-221) | 517 | |
Change of denotation of words explained (222-246) | 526 | |
Explanation of Bhavana (247-316) | 531 | |
Explanation of Vikalpa ?Option (317) | 542 | |
Explanation of Sutra 25 (340) | 546 | |
Sutras XXVII ? XXXII. | ||
The Veda not the work of an author | 553-555 |